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Life’s meaning is a deeply important yet perplexing topic. It is often unclear what 
people are talking about when they talk about life having “meaning”. This paper 
attempts to clarify things by articulating a schema for understanding claims about 
meaning. It defends a theory according to which X means Y iff Y is a correct 
interpretation of X—i.e., if Y is a correct answer to an interpretive question, Z. I argue 
that this (perhaps surprising) claim has impressive explanatory power. Applying this 
schema to life explains the many ways in which people seem to think and talk about 
life’s meaning, and common claims in the philosophical literature. It also makes sense 
of empirical findings from psychological research on perceived meaning in life. 
1 Introduction 
It is commonly thought that the search for life’s meaning reflects a deep human need 
(Frankl, 1971). In fact, the feeling that one’s life is meaningful has been linked with so many 
indexes of mental and physical health that it has been called a “flagship indicator of well-
being” (Steger, 2017; Steger et al., 2013). Thus, it’s clear that life’s meaning is very important 
to us. What’s not clear is what it is.  
Philosophers interested in this topic frequently jump straight to the question of what 
makes life meaningful, breezing past the prior question of what we are even talking about 
when we talk about life’s meaning (see Metz, 2013, Chapter 1 for an exception). This is 
surprising, given that philosophers typically pride themselves on conceptual clarity and 
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precision. One obvious reason to start with the conceptual question is that doing so would 
help us assess substantive theories. It is difficult, after all, to assess a theory without a clear 
understanding of what it’s a theory of. The trouble, and reason for aversion, is that the topic 
is notoriously slippery. Indeed, in many circles, it is something of a joke. (Think of the Monty 
Python film, or the countless comic strips featuring mountaintop gurus.) We seem to talk 
about life’s meaning in many different—and often vague—ways. Some think that there is no, 
or at least no coherent, concept of life’s meaning (Oakley, 2010). But the standard response to 
the apparent disorder is simply to take no stand on what, if anything, unifies these different 
ways of thinking and talking about the subject. That is, many contemporary philosophers 
interested in life’s meaning attempt to isolate and clarify just one of the things we sometimes 
seem to be talking about (e.g., Wolf, 2010), or propose revisionist theories not intended to 
capture ordinary ways of thinking or talking at all (e.g., Calhoun, 2015; Višak, 2017). 
This paper takes the conceptual question head on, searching for the signal in the noise. 
It is an attempt to make sense of the myriad ways in which we think and talk about life’s 
meaning by integrating them into a more general account of meaning. After all, the term 
“meaningful” is applied to words, sentences, stories, natural signs (e.g., the rings in a tree 
trunk), events, activities, and entire lives. For some reason, philosophers have tended to claim 
that life’s meaning is unrelated to these other kinds of meaning.1 “Clearly,” Antti Kauppinen 
writes, “life doesn’t have a meaning like words or signs do. It… would be misleading to look 
for meaning of life in this direction” (2012, pp. 352–353; see also Martela, 2017, p. 234). Of 
 
1 There are some exceptions (Goldman, 2018; Thomas, 2019; Willison, 2017). 
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course, words and lives are not meaningful in the same way. But, then, neither are words and 
signs. Such differences do not imply that these notions “have nothing to do with” each other 
(Kauppinen, 2016, p. 282). The different uses of “meaning” do not appear to be like the 
different uses of “bank” (the financial institution and the side of a river). In fact, I will defend 
a view on which there is an underlying unity: what something means is what one would learn 
if one interpreted it properly. Life, like a word or natural sign, has meaning because it admits 
of correct interpretation.2 
To clarify this view, I’ll first discuss interpretation (§2), and then consider how we 
interpret life in particular (§3). Life has meaning(s), I argue, because it admits of 
interpretation. The many ways of thinking and talking about life’s meaning reflect different 
ways of interpreting life, and different things that “life” can refer to. Finally, I’ll review what 
I take to be the merits of this theory (§4), and some puzzles it raises (§5). 
2 What is interpretation? 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term “meaning” first appeared in 
English in the 14th century. Meaning was said to be possessed by linguistic terms, stories, 
dreams, as well as signs and omens. Meaning was often understood to be something non-
obvious, and in some cases even mysterious. For instance, only those with special powers 
 
2 This does not entail that things are meaningless until they are interpreted. Just as kale is 
nutritious even if it rots in the fridge, a note can be meaningful even if it slips underneath 
the fridge and is consequently never interpreted. The kale is nutritious because, if it’s eaten, 
it nourishes. The note is meaningful because, if it’s interpreted, it reveals meaning. 
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could decipher the meanings of divine signs or omens. But in all cases meanings were 
messages or information derived from meaning-bearers. Something is meaningful when, as it 
were, it has something to tell us. The process of “getting at the message” (Kuhns, 1960, p. 
7)—i.e., deriving meaning—is called interpretation.  
So, how does this process work? Charles Taylor writes that interpretation “is an 
attempt to make clear, to make sense of an object of study… [it] aims to bring to light an 
underlying coherence or sense” (1971, p. 3). Interpretation is a “sense-making” process, and 
making sense of something involves fitting it coherently into a web of background knowledge. 
To illustrate, suppose I’m driving down the road, when I see some orange cones and quickly 
realize their meaning: that the left lane is closing up ahead. How did I do this? As a result of 
my visual experience, I formed a new belief that there were cones arranged in a certain 
configuration in the road. This belief was then integrated into a much larger web of beliefs 
about traffic cones and road maintenance, the rules of the road, and so on. Situating my new 
belief into this web allowed me to make sense of the cones. The new belief linked up with the 
old ones in such a way that I could do things like predict what would happen down the road.  
This account of interpretation is empirically grounded. As a couple of psychologists 
put it, interpretation involves “linking something new or perplexing to existing knowledge 
structures… The interpreting mind takes the target stimulus and thinks how it relates to what 
it already believes” (Baumeister & Landau, 2018, p. 5). These “knowledge structures” are 
sometimes explicitly called “meaning frameworks” (George & Park, 2016). They are 
understood to be networks of claims (either implicitly or explicitly accepted) about what the 
world is like and how it works. In short, the picture of interpretation that we get from 
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psychology is this: “When individuals encounter something… that is not currently related to 
an existing framework… it said to be meaningless… [it only appears] meaningful once a 
relationship… is discovered or imposed” (Proulx & Heine, 2006, p. 310). And thus, “[w]hen 
we ask what something means, we are trying to locate that something within our web of 
mental representations” (Martela & Steger, 2016, p. 537). 
It’s important to clarify that these “webs”, “frameworks”, or “networks” of beliefs aim 
to represent facts. They are supposed to be veridical, and only lead to correct interpretations 
to the extent that they are. One can interpret something “correctly” by the standard of one’s 
beliefs, yet still misinterpret it because those beliefs are mistaken. For instance, in the driving 
example, if I believed that orange cones were only used to draw drivers’ attention to potholes, 
I would have concluded something erroneous about their meaning. In light of my mistaken 
beliefs, the erroneous conclusion might have been justified. But it would nevertheless have 
been a misinterpretation. I would not have seen the true meaning of the cones. To understand 
what makes an interpretation correct, we need to consider the point of interpretation. 
We interpret in order to answer questions. This does not require that one have a 
specific question consciously in mind. But it does require one to be, at some level, trying to 
answer a question by situating an object into a larger context.3 Consider scientists interpreting 
 
3 People are constantly interpreting the world around them, and the vast majority of this is 
done non-consciously (Griffin & Ross, 1991; Ross, 2014). Presumably, the more practiced 
one is at a certain kind of interpretation, the more automatic the process becomes. Someone 
learning a new language might, in interpreting a word, need to consciously ask what it refers 
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data. They might be trying to answer any number of questions. For instance: (1) “How are 
variables A and B related?”; (2) “What best explains these results?”; or (3) “What predictions 
do these data enable us to make?” (1) is about the internal structure of the dataset. Answering 
it involves situating individual datapoints in the context of the set, noticing patterns and 
interrelationships. (2) is about the origins or causes of the observations, and (3) is about their 
impact or effects. Answering these questions involves situating the data in the context of a 
larger body of knowledge (e.g., a theory) about the phenomena in question. We might call 
the answers to these sorts of interpretive questions natural meanings (Grice, 1957).  
Many of the things that we are interested in interpreting are products of intentional 
agency. For instance, we might interpret an artifact in order to answer, “What is this for?”, or 
human behavior in order to answer, “What are they trying to do?” Answering such questions 
involves situating interpretive objects in a context of agents’ intentions or purposes.4 Thus, we 
might call the answers to such interpretive questions purposive meanings. 
Finally, one obvious reason to interpret is to answer questions about value or 
importance—e.g., “What is this good for?” or “Why does this matter?” Call the answers to 
 
to, or what sounds correspond to the letters. Meanwhile, fluent speakers don’t have to 
bother. 
4 Since folk psychology posits intentions as proximate causes of many of our actions 
(Ravenscroft, 2016), purpose-questions might be reducible to origin-questions. But I won’t 
explore this possibility here. 
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such interpretive questions ethical meanings.5 Ethical questions can sensibly be asked of many 
interpretive objects (including datasets, behaviors, and artifacts). Answering them involves 
situating interpretive objects into a context of values or ideals. It will also typically require 
knowledge of the object’s natural and/or purposive meanings, since answering a question 
about something’s value or importance often requires knowing its causes, impact, and the 
purposes behind it. Indeed, I suspect that an interest in ethical meaning underlies much of our 
interest in natural and purposive meanings. After all, why answer questions about 
something’s origin, impact, or purpose if not to better understand its value, or determine 
whether one should care about it? This may be why people sometimes treat “meaningful” as 
practically synonymous with “important” or “matters”. A question like, “Are these data 
actually meaningful?” can be a way of asking whether they tell us anything important. 
We are now in a position to see what makes for a correct interpretation. Since 
interpretation aims at answering questions, interpreting correctly requires answering 
correctly. Formally, X means Y iff Y is an interpretation of X which correctly answers an 
interpretive question, Z.6 This is why false beliefs can lead to misinterpretation. They can lead 
 
5 Joshua Thomas’ (2019) view, which is quite similar to mine, accounts for natural and 
purposive meaning, but not ethical. This is, in my view, a serious omission for a theory that 
aims to illuminate life’s meaning. I’ll discuss Thomas’ view further in §4.3. 
6 If, for some reason, interpretive questions had no answers, then there would be no meanings. 
Similarly, if we didn’t have epistemic access to the answers, then we would never know any 
meanings. The interpretation theory is an account of what we are doing when we think and 
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the interpretive process to yield incorrect answers, even when the process itself was otherwise 
faultless. To illustrate, consider a decline in gasoline prices. To know the meaning of this price 
drop one must see how it fits into the complex interactions of the economy. If “Oil production 
has recently increased” is a correct answer to “How did this happen?”, then that’s one 
meaning of the price drop. If “Carbon emissions will rise from increased fuel consumption” 
is a correct answer to “What effect will this have?”, then that’s another meaning. Someone 
with mistaken beliefs (e.g., that prices drop when production decreases, or that consumption 
declines when prices drop) would probably answer these questions incorrectly, thereby 
misinterpreting the price drop.  
As this shows, on the interpretation theory, most things will have multiple meanings. 
A single object might yield answers to numerous interpretive questions. And those questions 
often admit of multiple correct answers. For instance, “What is he doing?” might correctly be 
answered by: “Hammering a nail”, “Building a wall”, “Building a school”, or “Building 
something that will benefit future generations”. (The difference between these answers seems 
to arise from the scale of the context into which the movements are placed.) Of course, people 
do talk of the meaning of X. But, it’s quite common to use definite articles despite multiplicity. 
For instance, when Brits talk about “the queen”, they mean the British queen. It would be 
silly to object, “What do you mean the queen? There are multiple queens.” Indeed there are. 
But context makes clear which individual is relevant. Similarly, since interpreters are 
 
talk about meaning and is thus compatible with error theories or skepticism about meaning. 
My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me on this. 
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motivated to answer particular questions, they will be looking for particular meanings. The 
meaning of X is thus the meaning one was looking for, the answer to the question that 
motivated the interpretation. 
When something lacks the kind of meaning one is looking for, conversational  norms 
will recommend claiming that it is without meaning (Grice, 1975). For analogy, consider two 
Americans, Abe and Bea, vacationing in a foreign country. They stop at a vendor’s stall. Abe 
asks Bea, “Do you have any cash?” Bea replies, “Yes,” and hands Abe U.S. dollars. Bea is 
either obtuse or trying to be funny. Abe was looking for cash, but he was clearly not looking 
for U.S. dollars. Thus, the appropriate thing for Bea to say is that she has no cash. While she 
does have some, she doesn’t have the relevant kind. Similarly, when something lacks the 
sought-after kind of meaning—i.e., when it doesn’t answer the operative interpretive 
question—it will be appropriate to say that it is meaningless, even if it has other kinds of 
meaning. This suggests that, besides correctness, interpretation is also subject to a norm of 
relevance. A satisfactory interpretation of X will not merely answer some interpretive 
question—though this would yield a genuine (if irrelevant) meaning. It will answer the 
question(s) that motivated the interpretation in the first place. 
3 How do we interpret life? 
According to the interpretation theory, understanding what people are talking about 
when they talk about meaning requires specifying: (1) what they are interpreting; (2) what 
question(s) are of interest; and (3) what network of facts the interpretive object is being placed 
into. Applying this schema to talk of life’s meaning explains why the topic is so confusingly 
multifarious. But it should also ameliorate the confusion. “Life” can refer to a number of 
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things. So, there are a number of potential interpretive objects. Depending on which of these 
one is interpreting, and depending on the interpreter’s interests, different questions will be 
more or less relevant, and different contexts will make more or less sense.  
Sometimes “life” refers to a person’s activities. For instance, when an angsty teenager 
tells her parents to stay out of her life, she is telling them to be less involved in her affairs. We 
can think of these as parts of a life: the projects, decisions, failures, triumphs, and so on that 
compose a life; or even whole “chapters” of a life, like one’s childhood or time in college. 
These are, I think, typical interpretive objects when people talk about meaning in one’s life. 
(Relationships, projects, etc. are things going on in a life.)  
Consider someone wondering whether their work is meaningful. One question they 
might be trying to answer is, “Is this a project of worth?” An especially salient context in 
which to interpret a part of one’s life is the whole of it. Thus, one might try to see how the 
project fits with one’s values and aspirations, whether it is coherent with the rest of one’s life 
story, whether in pursuing it one is being true to oneself, etc. Empirical research has found 
that, in interpreting their experiences, people do typically use “life-schemas”—their sense of 
who they are and their life story—as the interpretive framework (Janoff-Bulman & Berg, 1998; 
Park, 2010; Thompson & Janigian, 1988). But a person might also try to answer this question 
by situating their projects into larger contexts. For instance, one might think that one’s work 
would only truly be of worth if it has value for others. In that case, one might try to determine 
whether one’s work will make a valuable contribution to a local community, or some larger 
or more distant group. If one harbors grandiose ambitions, one may even try to interpret the 
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project in the context of global or cosmic history. (Though, the project is likely not to have 
meaning at that scale. I return to this issue in §4.1)  
Another referent of “life” is a whole life: Albert Einstein’s, say, or Nelson Mandela’s. 
Whole lives seem to be the interpretive objects involved in talk about the meaning of a life. 
When I think about the meaning of Mandela’s life, I’m not considering specific decisions or 
events. I’m considering the whole thing.7 When interpreting whole lives, common questions 
might include: “Did this life have good effects?” (Smuts, 2013), “Did it go well?” (Cahn & 
Vitrano, 2014), and “Did it make a valuable contribution to society?” (Martela, 2017). Natural 
contexts in which to interpret whole lives would include a family and its history (Velleman, 
2005), a community, a country, or perhaps even human history broadly. Indeed, 
paradigmatically meaningful lives (e.g., Einstein’s and Mandela’s) are ones that provide 
strong, affirmative answers to such questions, even in relatively large contexts. 
Finally, “life” can refer to something even larger—not a specific life, but life itself. This 
expression might refer to the existence of humanity, or of living beings of any kind. This seems 
to be the interpretive object when people talk about The Meaning of Life. Such people are not 
focused on any particular life, or even any group of lives, but on something grander (Levine, 
 
7 This is not to say that the meanings of wholes and parts are independent. The meaning of a 
sentence is determined partly by the meanings of the words that constitute it and how those 
words are arranged. But its meaning is not identical to the meaning of any individual word. 
Similarly, the meanings of Mandela’s life depend on, but are not identical to, the meanings 
of the events in it and how these parts are arranged.  
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1988; Seachris, 2009). If that’s so, then the context in which one interprets life itself would 
need to be quite large: the entire world or cosmos. This is presumably why “What is the 
meaning of life?” is often called the “cosmic question” about life’s meaning (Martela, 2017; 
W. Wong, 2008). Interpreting life itself might involve asking: “Why does life exist?” or “For 
what purpose was humanity created?” This would explain why people tend to think that one 
needs a religious worldview in order to think that life itself has meaning. For it’s not entirely 
clear whether these questions have answers in the absence of a divine plan, or some such 
thing. (I’m not claiming that this is so, just noting that it’s not clear, which would explain why 
some people think this. More on this point in §5.) 
I have suggested some questions, drawn largely from the philosophical literature, that 
people typically try to answer by interpreting life. The majority of them were ethical questions 
about life’s value, what ideals a particular life exemplifies or how well it went, etc. In other 
words—unsurprisingly—people are mostly interested in life’s ethical meaning. However, 
natural and purposive meanings can also be of interest. For instance, an orphan might seek 
answers to questions about their origins. Learning about their biological parents might help 
them to see new or different meanings in their life. People also seek, and some think they have 
found, a “life purpose” (i.e., an answer to the question, “Why am I here?”) that constitutes a 
meaning of their life. Moreover, with respect to life itself, perhaps the most natural interpretive 
questions are about origins (“Where did we come from?”) or purposes (“What are we here 
for?”). 
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4 Merits of the interpretation theory 
The interpretation theory explains many ordinary intuitions and practices, and thus 
much of what goes on in the philosophical literature. It also fits quite nicely with empirical 
research on individuals’ experiences of meaning in their lives. And, finally, it has a 
noteworthy advantage over similar, recently proposed theories. 
4.1 Making sense of the philosophical literature and ordinary practice 
The interpretation theory, again, claims that X means Y iff Y is an interpretation of X 
that correctly answers an interpretive question, Z. Sometimes X is an utterance, sometimes 
the rings in a tree, and sometimes life. By unifying the various forms of meaning, the theory 
explains why we would call such different things “meaningful”. This is something others have 
had to assume was a—rather incredible—coincidence (Kauppinen, 2012; Martela, 2017). It 
also explains why there are three similar but distinct locutions for talking about life’s meaning: 
people sometimes talk of meaning in a life (when X = a part of a life), the meaning of a life 
(when X = a whole life), and the meaning of life (when X = life itself). By noting that Z also 
varies, we are also able to explain why many philosophers think that questions about life’s 
meaning are “amalgams of logically diverse questions” (Hepburn, 1966, p. 262). A question 
like, “Was this life meaningful?” is thought to be “not so much a single question but a place-
holder for a whole set of questions” (Baggini, 2005, p. 1; see also Metz, 2001). This is because 
interpreting something (including a life) can involve answering a range of questions. 
The theory also explains why life’s meaning is often considered “deep”. Depth 
imagery is very common in discussions of interpretation. For instance, interpretation “aims 
to bring to light an underlying coherence or sense” (Taylor, 1971, p. 3) and reveals what is 
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“below the surface” (Skinner, 1972, p. 394). Meaning feels deep because it is revealed by this 
process. Moreover, by understanding interpretation as a sense-making process, the view also 
explains why, in other languages, expressions translatable as “life’s meaning” usually employ 
the language of sense-making. For instance, in French the expression is, “le sens de la vie”, 
and in German “der Sinn des Lebens”. This is not a Western phenomenon either. “Yìyì” and 
“imi” from the Chinese and Japanese expressions for “life’s meaning” (“shēngmìng de yìyì” 
and “jinsei no imi” respectively) are commonly translated as “sense”.  
The theory offers a neat explanation for the non-additivity of meaning. For contrast, 
pleasure is plausibly an additive good. If one wanted to know how pleasant yesterday was, 
one could take each individual moment of the day, measure how much pleasure one felt at 
that moment, and simply add these momentary scores to calculate the pleasantness of the 
whole. Many think that this picture is not plausible when it comes to meaning (Brännmark, 
2003; Kauppinen, 2012; McMahan, 2002, pp. 174–182; Velleman, 1991; W. Wong, 2008). 
One can’t calculate the meaning of a life by adding up the meaning of its constituent time 
slices. One can’t even assess the meaning of a part without knowing how it fits into the larger 
picture of one’s life. One doesn’t know, for instance, how meaningful a relationship is without 
at least knowing how it ends. The meaning of each part of a life depends (partly) on what 
came before and what comes afterwards, on how all the parts hang together. Or so many 
people think (Seachris, 2011). These claims sit quite nicely with the interpretation theory. 
Something’s meaning depends on how it should be interpreted. And interpreting something 
involves situating it into a network of facts—that is, seeing how it fits into a larger picture. 
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Many philosophers, for related reasons, appeal to narratives in theorizing about life’s 
meaning (Fischer, 2005; Kauppinen, 2015; MacIntyre, 1981; Seachris, 2009; Velleman, 1991; 
W. Wong, 2008). For instance, on Alan Goldman’s view, “meaningfulness in life is a matter 
of narrative intelligibility” (2018, p. 127). This makes sense, given that many of our beliefs are 
structured as narratives (Baumeister & Newman, 1994), and we often make sense of things 
by telling stories about them (Niles, 2010). Many people think about the universe in terms of 
a narrative—starting with a divine creation, perhaps, or the big bang. The same is true of the 
way people think about their country or nation (natural contexts in which to interpret whole 
lives—e.g., Jefferson’s or Mandela’s). Of particular relevance are self- or life-schemas 
(Markus, 1977; Thompson & Janigian, 1988). People tend to think of themselves as the 
protagonists in stories of their own making, and use these stories to interpret their experiences 
(McAdams, 2001; McLean & Pasupathi, 2011; Pals, 2006; Thompson & Janigian, 1988). 
Thus, the desire for a meaningful life partly reflects the fact that many people “care intensely 
for the narrative of [their] own life and very much want it to be a good story, with a decent 
hero” (Kahneman, 2011, p. 387). There is some evidence that people with a clear sense of 
narrative identity tend to experience their lives as more meaningful (Bauer et al., 2008), the 
same goes for people who think more about their past and future (Baumeister et al., 2013), 
and about different ways in which their life story could have played out (Kray et al., 2010).  
However, though the interpretation theory explains why so many people see a 
connection between life’s meaning and narrative, it does not claim that a life’s meaning just is 
a matter of its narrative properties (as, e.g., Goldman does). Goldman, rightly, claims that 
something’s meaning depends on how it fits into a larger whole (2018, pp. 119–121). 
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However, that larger whole needn’t be a story. Interpretive frameworks can be non-narrative 
in structure. There are apparently some people who don’t see themselves as protagonists in a 
unified life story (Strawson, 2004), and therefore will not use such stories to interpret their 
lives. Yet, according to the interpretation theory, such people will be able to see meaning in 
life—even if it’s not the same meaning that narratively-minded people would see. 
Finally, the interpretation theory explains why people often think that human lives are 
meaningless from the point of view of the universe (“sub specie aeternitatis”)—even if they can 
be meaningful from a more human point of view (e.g., Blackburn, 2002, p. 79; Nagel, 1971; 
Tolstoy, 1899; for contrary views, see Seachris, 2013; Landau, 2011). Adopting different 
points of view influences assessments of meaning because it involves changing the network 
of facts into which one situates the interpretive object. One might initially think one’s life is 
meaningful, because one is interpreting it in the context of a local community. Thinking about 
the vastness of the universe or the distant future can suddenly produce a feeling of 
meaninglessness. But, as Nagel put it, this “is just a way of seeing your life embedded in a 
larger context” (1987, p. 96). While seeing meaning requires locating something within a 
larger context, if “the bigger picture” gets too big the interpretive object disappears into the 
background. It is hard to see (unless, perhaps, one is religious) how human life could be 
noteworthy in the vastness of the cosmos. We seem imperceptibly small at that scale. Hence, 
life’s meaning—like linguistic and other kinds of meaning—is context-sensitive. Our lives can 
have meanings in local contexts, even if they don’t in global or cosmic contexts. 
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4.2 Making sense of the empirical literature 
Psychological research on life’s meaning goes back several decades (Baumeister, 1991; 
Crumbaugh & Maholick, 1964; Frankl, 1971). And, with the rise of positive psychology, the 
literature has mushroomed (Steger, 2013; P. T. Wong, 2013). This research “aims to look at 
the subjective experiences of human beings and asks what makes them experience 
meaningfulness in their lives” (Martela & Steger, 2016, p. 532). What this research has found 
is that the people who judge their lives to be meaningful also feel: a sense of coherence or 
comprehension; purposeful, that they have goals, projects, and direction; and that their lives 
and/or activities are valuable and significant (George & Park, 2016; Martela & Steger, 2016). 
The interpretation theory can explain these correlations. To interpret life is to make 
sense of it. Thus, interpreting life will produce a corresponding sense of coherence or 
comprehension, a feeling that one has made sense of something. The accompanying feelings 
of purpose and significance reflect the kinds of questions that people are likely to try to answer 
in interpreting life. People will generally be most interested in knowing about the point or 
purpose, and value of life. Consider again the questions that I suggested people ask. One set 
(“Is this a project of worth?”; “Did this life make a valuable contribution to the world?”; “Did 
this life have good effects?”) is clearly about importance or value. Questions about purpose 
are also common. These kinds of questions can be asked about the parts of a life (“Does this 
project advance my larger life plans?”), a whole life (“What was this life all about?”), or life 
itself (“Does life have a, perhaps divine, purpose?”). Of course, questions about purpose and 
value are related. Usually, goals are only adopted when they are thought to be good things to 
pursue and achieve. Moreover, it will be hard for many people to see their lives as being 
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valuable if they aren’t doing anything with them. Hence, the interpretation theory predicts what 
psychologists have discovered. If thinking about life’s meaning involves locating life in a 
larger context in order to answer questions about origins, impact, purpose, or value, then one 
would expect people who experience life as meaningful to experience accompanying feelings 
of comprehension, purpose, and significance.  
It is perhaps no surprise, then, that psychologists have begun appealing to 
interpretation in their theoretical discussions (Baumeister & Landau, 2018; George & Park, 
2016; Martela & Steger, 2016; Proulx & Heine, 2006). For instance, Roy Baumeister claims 
that the search for life’s meaning “reflect[s] the desire to construct some interpretation of… 
life” (1991, p. 61). Other psychologists have appealed to interpretation without using the 
term—for instance, by claiming that meaning is the “output of having made sense of 
something” (Rosso et al., 2010, p. 94; Pratt & Ashforth, 2003). Indeed, the editors of a 
research handbook write that “all accounts of meaning converge at sense making” (Markman 
et al., 2013, p. 4). In addition to its explanatory power, then, another merit of the 
interpretation theory is that it provides common ground between philosophy and psychology, 
which could facilitate greater interdisciplinary collaboration. 
4.3 An advantage over recent proposals 
Alan Goldman (2018) and Joshua Thomas (2019) have recently defended theories 
quite similar to the interpretation theory. Like me, they think that there is an underlying unity 
between life’s meaning and other kinds of meaning (e.g., semantic and natural), and that 
seeing something as meaningful requires locating it in a larger whole. Goldman notes that a 
word’s meaning depends on its role in a sentence; a sentence’s meaning depends on its role 
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in a discourse; etc. Thomas claims that meaningfulness is “sensefulness”. Given that 
interpretation is a sense-making process, this makes his view very similar to mine. Despite the 
similarities, however, the interpretation theory differs from these recent proposals in several 
ways. I will highlight what I take to be the most important difference, and the resulting 
advantage that the interpretation theory has over these alternatives. 
Both Goldman and Thomas think that meaning is highly subjective, a matter of what 
particular individuals think. Goldman claims that meaningfulness is a three-place relation: X 
means Y to S. “For an event to mean something in someone’s life, it must mean something 
to a subject who experiences it in some way”, and what that meaning is “depends only on 
one’s own interpretation” (2018, pp. 125, 143). Goldman notes that some interpretations are 
better than others, but only because some are not psychologically possible or sustainable. So, 
if it were possible for me to interpret a root canal as meaning that I was going to be eternally 
happy, then the root canal would actually mean this. At least, it would mean this to me, and 
subject-relative meaning is the only kind of meaning that Goldman countenances. Similarly, 
on Thomas’ view, a meaning is a link or relationship in a network of mental representations. 
“What meanings something has will thus be relative to certain individuals, or rather certain 
groups of individuals who share the same mindset and beliefs about the world” (2019, p. 12). 
One can try to reason with people who disagree about something’s meaning (i.e., try to change 
their mindset and beliefs). But their contrary perceptions of meaning are no better or worse 
than one’s own. Thomas even claims that the idea of “objective meaning” is incoherent (2019, 
p. 12). 
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In contrast, on the interpretation theory, objects have meanings even if they aren’t 
actually interpreted, much less interpreted correctly (see note 2). Perhaps, if there were no 
beings capable of apprehending meaning (i.e., of interpreting), then there would be no 
meaning. But this does not entail that X means whatever anyone takes X to mean. On my view, 
X means Y iff Y is a correct answer to an interpretive question, Z. And an answer’s correctness 
will not typically depend on what some particular individual thinks. It will depend on what’s 
true. The view does recognize a kind of subject-dependence. The fact that objects have many 
meanings entails that different people can see different meanings in the same life, and both 
can be right. But what makes such meanings genuine is not simply a matter of what is going 
on in a person’s head.  
This strikes me as a serious advantage for the interpretation theory. It seems clear that 
people can be mistaken about meaning. Recall the gasoline price example. Someone who 
thought that the price drop meant that oil production had declined would be wrong. It would 
seem to them that the price drop had that meaning. But that appearance is misleading. 
Similarly, semantic meaning, famously, “ain’t in the head” (Putnam, 1975). Very few people 
would say that a word’s meaning is whatever meaning I see in it.8 Subject-dependence is also 
very unpopular in substantive theories of life’s meaning. A common (possibly majority) view 
is that “[t]hinking your life is meaningful doesn’t make it so. We are not infallible about 
meaning” (Kauppinen, 2014, p. 164). Thus, the fact that Goldman and Thomas do not 
 
8 One of my favorite lines from the cult-classic film, The Princess Bride, is: “You keep using 
that word. I do not think it means what you think it means.” 
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recognize a distinction between perceptions of meaning and meaning itself seems like a 
serious weakness for their views. 
5 Puzzles for the interpretation theory 
Having enumerated the merits of this theory, it’s time to highlight a couple of puzzles 
it faces. These are potential weak points in the view, which I will attempt to address. 
The first is that the view makes meaning ubiquitous. Anything, including any life, that 
can be correctly interpreted has meaning. Some may object to this, claiming that life’s 
meaning is supposed to be hard to come by, precious and elusive. Yet psychologists have 
found that most people take their lives to be pretty meaningful (Heintzelman & King, 2014). 
That is, the average person reports moderate agreement with claims like, “I understand my 
life’s meaning”, and “I am able to spend most of my time in meaningful activities and 
pursuits”.9 So, it seems that individual lives and their parts are widely regarded as having 
meaning.  
That said, some people do think meaningful lives are rare. So, what’s going on with 
these people? The interpretation theory suggests two possibilities. First, such people might be 
employing especially large interpretive contexts. As discussed in §4.1, if the context is too 
large, interpretive objects can disappear into the background. A typical human life may be 
meaningful when interpreted in local (e.g., familial or community) contexts. But only a rare 
few will be meaningful when interpreted in very large contexts. Someone employing a global 
 
9 These come from the Meaning in Life Questionnaire (Steger et al., 2006), and Perceived 
Personal Meaning Scale (P. T. Wong, 1998)  respectively. 
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context will therefore consider meaningful lives to be few and far between. And someone 
employing a cosmic context may think that no life has meaning. A second possibility is that 
such people are seeking answers to presumptuous questions. To illustrate, suppose an 
interpreter is trying to answer, “What lasting contribution did this life make to humanity?” 
This question will frequently suffer from presupposition failure. Most lives do not make such 
contributions and will therefore not yield answers to that question. Hence, our interpreter will 
not consider them meaningful (see the final paragraph of §2).  
A related puzzle for the interpretation theory is that some people (e.g., Craig, 2000) 
think that life would be meaningless if metaphysical naturalism were true—i.e., if the natural 
world is all that exists.10 This is a puzzle because life is no less interpretable within a 
naturalistic worldview. So, why would naturalism be thought to entail nihilism? One reason 
is because a person’s worldview is their most comprehensive interpretive framework (Koltko-
Rivera, 2004). In contemplating the truth of naturalism, someone who holds a non-naturalist 
worldview is contemplating the disintegration of the very thing that enables them to interpret 
life. They will therefore have trouble seeing meaning in it. However, let’s consider someone 
who can effectively interpret life within a naturalistic worldview and who thinks that, within 
that framework, life has no meaning. This response might also result from presupposition 
failure. Some people think that if naturalism were true “nothing would matter” (e.g., Parfit, 
2011, p. 619). In other words, naturalism entails an ethical error theory. If that were true, then 
any ethical questions that might motivate us to interpret life (see §3) would lack answers. 
 
10 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this to my attention. 
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Similarly, for religious people the important questions about life will tend to reference the 
divine (e.g., “What is God’s plan for my life?”). If naturalism were true, these questions too 
would lack answers. Hence, life would not have the meanings these people seek. 
A third puzzle is that the interpretation theory might be thought to suggest that 
meaningfulness is a binary property (something either has meaning or it doesn’t). But, when 
we think about the meanings of lives, we often ask how meaningful they are, and expect 
gradable answers. Unlike words, which seem to simply have or lack a meaning, lives seem to 
be more or less meaningful. However, as indicated at the start, we talk about life’s meaning 
in many ways, and only sometimes do we expect life’s meaning to come in degrees. Questions 
like “What was the meaning of Mandela’s life?” or “What is the meaning of life itself?” don’t 
call for gradable answers. But it’s true that we do sometimes expect meaningfulness to come 
in degrees. So, this is something that the interpretation theory should explain.  
According to the view, meanings are messages, or answers to interpretive questions. 
Thus, more meaning might come from more answers, from stronger or clearer answers, or 
perhaps from answers in more or larger interpretive contexts. If an interpreter were interested 
in several related questions (e.g., “What was this life all about?”; “What valuable difference 
did it make?”; “Was it well-lived?”), then a life that yielded answers to more of them might 
be considered more meaningful than a life that yielded answers to fewer. A life that gave clear, 
strongly affirmative answers to those questions might also be considered more meaningful 
than a life that didn’t enable one to answer them clearly, or where the answer was ambivalent 
or negative. For instance, if the question were “Did this life make a positive difference in the 
world?”, Mandela’s life would yield the answer “Absolutely”. Many lives, however, would 
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yield, “Not really”, “Unclear”, or “Not at all”. These lives might, for this reason, be seen as 
less meaningful, even if they were not regarded as meaningless. Similarly, one thing that 
might lead one to see Mandela’s life as more meaningful than most is the fact that it provides 
an affirmative answer to such questions, even in relatively large interpretive contexts. 
Mandela’s life made a positive difference not just in a local community, but in his nation’s 
history, and arguably even global history. While many lives might not have meaning at that 
scale, his does. This might explain it’s being more meaningful. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper offered a theory of the many meanings of “meaning”. The basic idea is that 
a meaning is what one learns when one correctly interprets something. Interpretation involves 
making sense of something by situating it into a framework of facts in order to answer a 
question. Life can be meaningful, therefore, because it is an object of interpretation. Discourse 
surrounding life’s meaning is confusingly complex because “life” can refer to different things, 
each of which can be interpreted to answer many questions.  
This view explains: why so many kinds of things are called meaningful; why questions 
about meaning seem to be amalgams of different questions; why meaning feels “deep”; why 
meaning is non-additive; the relevance of narrative to meaning; why a cosmic context leads 
to a loss of meaning; and why meaning is subject-independent. It also fits well with the 
empirical finding that perceptions of meaning are highly correlated with perceptions of 
comprehension, purpose, and significance. The view faces a few puzzles: (1) Why do some 
people think meaning is elusive or rare? (2) How might naturalism entail nihilism? And (3) 
why does life’s meaning come in degrees? My responses were: (1) Most people don’t think 
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meaning is rare. Those that do must be using too large of a context or interested in questions 
that don’t have answers. (2) Naturalism would entail that questions about divine purposes, 
and perhaps also ethical questions, have no answers. Thus, if it were true, then several forms 
of meaning might be absent. And (3) lives are more meaningful when they answer more 
(relevant) interpretive questions, or when they provide stronger or clearer answers to those 
questions. 
The paper has done what the theory describes. It took something puzzling (talk of life’s 
meaning) and answered a question (“What is this about?”) by integrating it into a larger 
context (a general theory of meaning). The interpretation theory thus offers an interpretation 
of discourse about life’s meaning. If it is a correct one, then it should reveal the meaning of 
“life’s meaning”.  
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